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24

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the Evertsen

Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the South Ogden City
Planning Commission's ("Planning Commission") November 12, 1992 meeting was
not time barred by the 15-day limitation period set forth in section 25-7-6 of the
South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance (South Ogden City, Ut., Zoning Ordinance §
25-7-6 (1992)). Whether a statute of limitation applies to a cause of action is a
question of law, not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990).
When an appeal presents only questions of law, the reviewing court will review
the trial court's rulings for correctness and accord them no particular deference.
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
2.

Whether the District Court failed to properly rule that the

Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of"notice given for the Planning
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by the 30-day
limitation period set forth in section 10-9-103(2) of the Utah Municipal Land Use
Development and Management Act (Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2) (1993)).
Whether a statute of limitation applies to a cause of action is a question of law,
not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d at 869. When an appeal presents only
questions of law, the reviewing court will review the trial court's rulings for
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correctness and accord them no particular deference. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d at 1070.
3.

Whether the District Court failed to properly rule that the

Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by the 30-day
limitation period set forth in section 10-9-1001 of the Utah Municipal Land Use
Development and Management Act (Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1993)).
Whether a statute of limitation applies to a cause of action is a question of law,
not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d at 869. When an appeal presents only
questions of law, the reviewing court will review the trial court's rulings for
correctness and accord them no particular deference. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d at 1070.
4.

Whether the District Court failed to properly rule that the

Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by the 90-day
limitation period set forth in section 52-4-8 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993)). Whether a statute of limitation applies to a
cause of action is a question of law, not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d at
869. When an appeal presents only questions of law, the reviewing court will
review the trial court's rulings for correctness and accord them no particular
deference. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d at 1070.

SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2) (1993):
(a)
A municipality meets the requirements of reasonable
notice required by this chapter if it:
(i)
posts notice of the hearing or meeting in at least
three public places within the jurisdiction and publishes notice
of the hearing or meeting in a newspaper of general circulation
in the jurisdiction, if one is available; or
(ii)
gives actual notice of the hearing or meeting.
(b)
A municipal legislative body may enact an ordinance
establishing stricter notice requirements than those required by
this subsection.
(c)
(i)
Proof that one of the two forms of notice
authorized by this subsection was given is prima facie evidence
that notice was properly given.
(ii)
If notice given under the authority of this section
is not challenged as provided in Section 10-9-1001 within 30
days from the date of the meeting for which the notice was
given, the notice is considered adequate and proper.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1993):
(1)
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's
land use decisions made under this chapter or under the
regulation made under authority of this chapter until that
person has exhausted his administrative remedies.
(2)
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days
after the local decision is rendered.
3)
The courts shall:
(a)
presume that land use decisions and regulations
are valid;
(b)
determine only whether or not the decision is
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993):
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 and
52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to
void final action shall be commenced within 90 days after the
action except that with respect to any final action concerning
SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001
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the issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days after the
action.
South Ogden City, Utah, Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992):
Appeal to and Review by the City Council. The decision of the
Planning Commission shall not become final and effective until
fifteen days after notice of that decision has been mailed or
delivered to the applicant and delivered to the City Recorder
for presentation to the City Council. It shall not then become
final, if, prior to the expiration of that fifteen days, any
interested party has appealed the same to the City Recorder or
the City Council on its own motion has elected to review that
decision.
The decision of the Planning Commission may be appealed by
any interested party to the City Council by filing such appeal
with the City Recorder within fifteen days after notice of
decision is sent to the applicant. The City Council may review
that decision on its own motion made within that fifteen day
period.
South Ogden City, Utah, Zoning Ordinance, Article 7 (1992):
See Addendum, Attachment 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 12, 1992, the South Ogden City Planning Commission
("Planning Commission") held a public meeting and granted Appellant American
Capital Development, Inc. ("American Capital") a conditional use permit to
construct an 80-unit apartment complex on real property located in South Ogden
City, Utah pursuant to Article 7 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance
(South Ogden City, Ut. Zoning Ordinance §§ 25-7-1 through -8 (1992), a copy of
which is annexed hereto as Attachment 1). On April 29, 1993, the Evertsen
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County,
State of Utah (the "District Court") wherein they asked the District Court to set
aside or rescind American Capital's conditional use permit. The Evertsen Plaintiffs
alleged that the notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992
public meeting had been inadequate. On May 24, 1993, the District Court
convened a hearing on the Evertsen Plaintiffs' complaint. After hearing
arguments from the parties, the District Court ruled from the bench that the
Evertsen Plaintiffs would have until May 28, 1993 to file an appeal of the
Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision with the South Ogden City
Council ("City Council"). The District Court did not enter its bench ruling. On
May 28, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed their appeal with the City Council. On
October 6, 1993, American Capital timely moved the District Court to reconsider
its bench ruling of May 24, 1993. On October 20, 1993, the District Court heard
American Capital's motion. American Capital argued that the Evertsen Plaintiffs'
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challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission's
November 12, 1992 meeting was (1) time barred by a 15-day limitation period set
forth in Section 25-7-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance (South Ogden
City, Ut„ Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992)), (2) time barred by the 30 day
limitation periods set forth in Section 10-9-103(2)(c)(ii) and Section 10-9-1001(2) of
the Utah Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act (Utah Code
Ann. §§ 10-9-101 through -1003 (1993)), and (3) time barred by a 90-day limitation
period set forth in Section 52-4-8 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act (Utah
Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 through -9 (1993)). On October 20, 1993, the District Court
convened a hearing on American Capital's motion for reconsideration and, after
hearing arguments from the parties, denied the motion. On February 8, 1994, the
District Court entered its October 20, 1993 bench ruling and issued an Order in
which it concluded that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision was not time
barred by the 15-day limitation period set forth in Section 25-7-6 of the South
Ogden City Zoning Ordinance. The District Court's Order did not rule on the
applicability of other statutory limitation periods cited by American Capital in its
motion for reconsideration. This Appeal is from the Order entered by the District
Court on February 8, 1994.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On October 29, 1992, American Capital applied to the Planning

Commission for a conditional use permit to construct an 80-unit apartment
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housing complex on property located at approximately 5700 Wasatch Drive in
South Ogden City, Utah (the "Project"). (Record Index at p. 190-191).
2.

The Planning Commission placed American Capital's application

for a conditional use permit on the agenda of its November 12, 1992 public
meeting. (Record Index at p. 69-70).
3.

The Planning Commission and the City posted notice of the

November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting in three places within the City.
(Record Index at p. 187).
4.

On November 12, 1992, the Planning Commission held a public

meeting and considered American Capital's application for a conditional use
permit. (Record Index at p. 70). At this meeting, the Planning Commission
approved American Capital's application and granted American Capital a
conditional use permit to construct the Project. (Record Index at p. 267).
5.

Section 25-7-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance

("Zoning Ordinance") provides that decisions of the Planning Commission become
"final and effective" if no interested party appeals the decision to the City Council
within 15 days. South Ogden City, Ut., Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992). The
Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenged the Planning Commission's decision to grant
American Capital a conditional use permit on April 29, 1993 - 168 days after the
Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use permit.
(Record Index at p. 267).
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6.

Section 10-9-103(2) of the UMLUDMA provides that public notice

given for the meetings of municipal zoning authorities must be challenged within
30 days from the date of the meeting for which the notice was given; otherwise,
"the notice is considered adequate and proper/' Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2)
(1993). The Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenged the notice given for the Planning
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting on April 15, 1993 - 154 days after the
Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use permit.
(Record Index at p. 30).
7.

Section 10-9-1001 of the UMLUDMA provides that persons who

are adversely affected by a city's land use planning decisions may petition the
district court to review that decision, provided they do so within 30 days of the
city's decision. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(2) (1993). The Evertsen Plaintiffs first
petitioned the District Court to review the Planning Commission's decision to
grant American Capital a conditional use permit on April 29, 1993 — 168 days
after the Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use
permit. (Record Index at p. 267).
8.

Section 52-4-8 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act

("UOPMA") provides that any suit to void the action of a public body for failure to
give adequate notice of a public meeting must be commenced within 90 days.
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993). The Evertsen Plaintiffs first brought suit against
the City and the Planning Commission on April 29, 1993 - 168 days after the

SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001
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Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use permit.
(Record Index at p. 267).
9.

On April 29, 1993, The Evertsen Plaintiffs filed a "Complaint" in the

Second Judicial District Court wherein they asked the court to set aside or rescind
American Capital's conditional use permit because they alleged that the notice
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting had been
inadequate. (Record Index at p. 267). On May 6, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs
filed a "First Amended Complaint" asking for the same relief prayed for in its April
29, 1993 Complaint. (Record Index at p. 107).
10.

On May 24, 1993, the District Court convened a hearing to hear

the Evertsen Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Record Index at p. 137). After hearing
arguments from the parties, the District Court ruled from the bench that the
Evertsen Plaintiffs would have until May 28, 1993 to file an appeal of the
Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision with the City Council.
(Record Index at p. 138). The District Court did not enter its bench ruling at this
time. (Record Index at p. 138).
11.

On May 28, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed their appeal with

the City Council. (Record Index at p. 267).
12.

On July 27, 1993, the City Council convened a public meeting to

hear the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal. (Record Index at p. 267). At the conclusion
of this meeting, the City Council voted to revoke American Capital's conditional
use permit. (Record Index at p. 269).

SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001
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13.

On October 5, 1993, American Capital timely moved the District

Court to reconsider its bench ruling of May 24, 1993. (Record Index at p. 269).
14.

On October 20, 1993, the District Court heard American Capital's

Motion for Reconsideration. (Record Index at p. 234). American Capital argued
that:
a.

The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice

given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred
by the 15-day limitation period set forth in section 25-7-6 of the Zoning
Ordinance. (Record Index at p. 180).
b.

The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice

given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred
by the 30-day limitation period set forth in section 10-9-103(2) of the UMLUDMA.
(Record Index at p. 182).
c.

The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice

given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred
by the 30-day limitation period set forth in section 10-9-1001(2) of the
UMLUDMA. (Record Index at p. 182).
d.

The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice

given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred
by the 90-day limitation period set forth in section 52-4-8 of the UOPMA. (Record
Index at p. 183).

SLCL-7707 1 21928 0001
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e.

Due to the expiration of all relevant statutory limitation

periods, the City Council could not have lawfully heard the Evertsen Plaintiffs'
appeal on July 27, 1993. (Record Index at p. 168).
15.

On October 20, 1993, the District Court ruled from the bench and

denied American Capital's Motion for Reconsideration. (Record Index at p. 234).
16.

On February 8, 1994, the District Court entered its October 20,

1993 bench ruling and issued an Order in which it made the following "Findings of
Fact:"
a.

"On November 12, 1992, the South Ogden City Planning

Commission granter [sic] Intervenor-Defendant American Capital Development,
Inc. ('American Capital') a conditional use permit to construct an apartment
complex in South Ogden ('Project')." (Record Index at p. 268).
b.

"On the 29th day of April, 1993, Plaintiffs obtained an Order

prohibiting further activity by the South Ogden Planning Commission on the
Project." (Record Index at p. 268).
c.

"Based upon the above-referenced Order, Plaintiffs

commenced legal seeking [sic] relief from the Court as follows ... [f]or an order of
the Court staying all time periods of appeal to the City council [sic] from the
Planning Commission, said stay running from the date of the issuance of the
Conditional Use Permit forward to such applicable date that the Plaintiffs may
submit a proper appeal to the City Council on the issuance of Conditional [sic]
Use Permit." (Record Index at p. 268-69).
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d.

"Plaintiffs commence [sic] that the aforesaid legal action and

[sic] assert as that principle cause that they had not received effective notice of
the November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting." (Record Index at p. 269).
e.

"On a bench ruling of May 24, 1993, this Court found that

the Plaintiffs had not received effective notice of the November 12, 1992 Meeting
[sic]. And this Court granted the relief request [sic] by Plaintiffs, to wit extending
the time to which Plaintiffs could appeal the Planning Commission issuance [sic]
of the conditions [sic] used [sic] for American Capital to the South Ogden City
Council." (Record Index at p. 269).
f.

"On May 28, 1993, Plaintiffs filed their appeal of the

Planning Commission's issuance of the conditions [sic] used [sic] for American
Capital with the South Ogden City Council." (Record Index at p. 269).
g.

"On July 27, 1993, the City Council heard Plaintiffs' appeal

and revoked American Capital's conditional use permit." (Record Index at p. 269).
h.

"Plaintiffs, American Capital and South Ogden City all acted

in reliance upon the bench ruling of the Court." (Record Index at p. 269).
i.

"American Capital filed on October 5, 1993, a motion asking

the Court to reconsider its bench ruling." (Record Index at p. 269).
17.

The District Court's February 8, 1994 Order contained the

following "Conclusions of Law:"

SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001
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a.

"Public notice of the Planning Commission's November 12,

1992 meeting was inadequate because the City did not give adequate notice to the
effective landowners." (Record Index at p. 270).
b.

"That all parties in the litigation acted in reliance upon the

May 24, 1993 bench ruling of the Court. Plaintiffs [sic] challenge [sic] the
adequacy of the November 12, 1992 meeting was not barred by the 15 day
limitation periods [sic] set forth in §25-7-6 in the South Ogden City Zoning
Ordinance." (Record Index at p. 270).
c.

"NOW THEREFORE it is hereby ordered that American

Capital's Motion for Reconsideration of the May 24, 1993 bench warrant [sic] is
denied." (Record Index at p. 270).

SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On April 29, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed a district court suit
challenging the notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992
meeting; this suit was filed 168 days after the November 12, 1992 Planning
Commission meeting. The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen
Plaintiffs' suit was time barred by the 15-day limitation period set forth in the City
Zoning Ordinance, the 30-day limitation periods set forth in the Utah Municipal
Land Use Development and Management Act, and/or the 90-day limitation period
set forth in the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. The Evertsen Plaintiffs did
not prove, nor did the District Court find, that the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been
deprived of any constitutionally protected interests as a result of the action taken
by the Planning Commission on November 12, 1992. Accordingly, the District
Court could not have lawfully concluded that the aforementioned statutory
limitation periods were inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit. Therefore, the
District Court committed plain error by failing to conclude that the Evertsen
Plaintiffs' district court suit was time barred.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court erroneously ruled that the Evertsen Plaintiffs1 appeal
of the Planning Commission's decision was not time barred by the 15day appeal period set forth in the City Zoning Ordinance,
Section 25-7-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance provides the

procedure for appeal and review of Planning Commission decisions. It requires
an appeal to be filed with the City Recorder within 15 days after notice of the
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Planning Commission's decision is sent to the applicant; if an appeal of a Planning
Commission decision is not filed within 15 days, the Planning Commission's
decision becomes "final and effective:"
Appeal to and Review by the City Council. The decision of the
Planning Commission shall not become final and effective until
fifteen days after notice of that decision has been mailed or
delivered to the applicant and delivered to the City Recorder
for presentation to the City Council. It shall not then become
final if, prior to the expiration of that fifteen days, any
interested party has appealed the same to the City Recorder or
the City Council on its own motion has elected to review that
decision.
The decision of the Planning Commission may be appealed by
any interested party to the City Council by filing such appeal
with the City Recorder within fifteen days after notice of
decision is sent to the applicant. The City Council may review
that decision on its own motion made within that fifteen day
period.
South Ogden City, U t , Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992) (emphasis supplied).
The Utah Supreme Court enforces appellate limitation periods contained
in the zoning ordinances of local governments. In Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows
Co., 392 P.2d 40, 41 (Utah 1964), a landowner sought to enjoin a defendant
developer from building a mobile home park for which the developer had been
issued a county building permit. The trial court dismissed the action because the
plaintiff had not appealed the issuance of the building permit to the Salt Lake
County Board of Adjustments within the 90-day appeal period prescribed by the
Salt Lake County zoning ordinance 1 and authorized by the then applicable Utah
1

Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment General Rules of Procedure, July 16, 1963, General Rule of Procedure III: "An
appeal to the Board of Adjustments must be taken within ninety (90) days after the cause arises or the appeal will not be
considered by the Board of Adjustments/ Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 P.2d at 41, n. 1.
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County Land Use Development and Management Act. 2 Id. at 41-42 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1953)). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision:
The 90-day limitation period [authorized by] Sec. 17-27-16 is
designed to assure speedy appeal to the proper tribunal any
grievance that a party may have who is adversed by a decision
of an administrative agency. The evident purpose of the
statute is to assure the expeditious and orderly development of
a community, etc. ... But where, as in this case, the alleged
violation of the ordinance arose from the administration of a
zoning ordinance by an administrative officer or agency, as
provided in Sec. 17-27-16, appeal from that administrative
ruling should have been taken to the proper administrative
tribunal, or a suit should have been commenced in the courts
within the statutory period provided for in Sec. 17-27-16, which
in this case is 90 days.
Id. at 42 (footnotes omitted).
As in Lund, the Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to appeal the Planning
Commission's decision within the 15-day appeal period prescribed by the South
Ogden City Zoning Ordinance. The Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenged the
Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision on April 15, 1993, 154 days
after the Planning Commission had issued American Capital its conditional use
permit. (Record Index at p. 30). As a result, American Capital's conditional use
permit became "final and effective" on November 28, 1993, pursuant to Section 257-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance. South Ogden City, Ut., Zoning

2

Utah Code section 17-27-16 provided that "Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved
..., or by the decision of any administrative officer or agency based upon or made in the course of the administration or
enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution .... The time within which such appeal must be made ... shall be as
specified in the general rules provided in writing by the board of county commissioners ... / Lund v. Cottonwood hAtadows
Co., 392 P.2d at 42, n. 2 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1953)).
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Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992). Because the Evertsen Plaintiffs did not 'take' their appeal
to the proper administrative tribunal within the requisite limitation period as
required by Lund, their appeal of the Planning Commission's decision became time
barred. Therefore, contrary to section 25-7-6 cf the Zoning Ordinance and the
Utah Supreme Court's Lund decision, the District Court erroneously permitted
Plaintiff-Appellees to appeal the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992
decision to the City Council after the Zoning Ordinance's 15-day appellate
limitation period had expired.
II.

The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs1
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning
Commission's meeting was time barred by the 30-day 'challenge to
notice 1 limitation period set forth in the UMLUDMA.
Section 10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA provides a 30-day limitation period

within which persons must challenge the adequacy of notice given for a meeting
of a municipal zoning authority:
If notice given under the authority of this section is not
challenged as provided in Section 10-9-1001 within 30 days
from the date of the meeting for which the notice was given,
the notice is considered adequate and proper.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2)(c)(ii) (1993) (emphasis supplied). The District Court
failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' April 29, 1993 challenge to the
adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992
meeting was time barred by the UMLUDMA. By the plain language of section
10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA, the notice given for the Planning Commission's
November 12, 1992 meeting was "considered adequate and proper" on December
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13, 1992 — 31 days after the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting.
The Evertsen Plaintiffs' April 29, 1993 challenge to the notice given for the
November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting was untimely because it was
brought 168 days after that meeting. Pursuant to Section 10-9-103 of the
UMLUDMA and the Utah Supreme Court's Lund decision, no lawful basis for the
Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal existed at the time the District Court ordered the City
Council to hear the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal. Therefore, the District Court failed
to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal was time barred by the
UMLUDMA.
III.

The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs'
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning
Commission's meeting was time barred by the 30-day "procedural
limitation 1 period set forth in the UMLUDMA.
As noted in point II., above, section 10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA

provides that challenges to the adequacy of notice given for city zoning meetings
must be brought within 30 days of the meeting and within the procedural
limitation period set forth in section 10-9-1001 of the UMLUDMA. Section 10-91001 provides, in part, that:
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days
afte* the local decision is rendered.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(2) (1993) (emphasis supplied). The Evertsen
Plaintiffs did not petition the District Court to review the Planning Commission's
decision within the 30 day ' procedural limitation' period provided for in section 10-
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9-1001. The Evertsen Plaintiffs first petitioned the District Court to review the
Planning Commission's decision on April 29, 1993, 168 days after the Planning
Commission had issued American Capital its conditional use permit. (Record
Index at p. 267). Therefore, the Evertsen Plaintiffs' April 29, 1993 suit was time
barred by section 10-9-1001 of the UMLUDMA.
It is widely recognized within the zoning context that "review
proceeding[s] brought after the time period prescribed by statute ha[ve] elapsed
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." Rathkopf's The Law of Planning and
Zoning, § 42.04[1] at 42.14 (1993). This principle has been applied to bar late filed
suits in cases strikingly similar to this case. For example, in St. Germain v. Zoning
Board of Appeals, 316 N.Y.S.2d 408, 410 (Ny. Sup. Ct. 1970), a New York court
specifically held that a trial court's extension of the statutory time for seeking
review of a city's zoning decision was invalid. In Bolin v. City of Portales, 548 P.2d
1210, 1211-1212 (N.M. 1976), the New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed a suit
challenging a city's land use decision because the suit was not filed with the
district court within 30 days of the city's decision, as required by a New Mexico
statute, despite the plaintiff's assertion that the notice given for the city's hearing
of the matter had been inadequate. In Serna v. Board of County Commissioners, 540
P.2d 212, 214 (N.M. 1975), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a petitioner's
failure to file for writ of certiorari in a district court within a statutorily prescribed
30-day period, deprived the district court of jurisdiction to subsequently review a
county's zoning decision. In Fish Hook Association, Inc. v. Grover Brothers, 417
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N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the Minnesota Court of Appeals
dismissed a suit to enjoin a county's issuance of a conditional use permit to a
developer of a proposed mobile home park. The Fish Hook plaintiffs owned
residential property adjacent to the proposed mobile home park and alleged that
they had not received adequate notice of the county zoning authority meeting at
which the conditional use permit had been granted. Id.

The Fish Hook court

dismissed the suit because the plaintiffs had not brought suit to enjoin the
issuance of the conditional use permit within a 30-day appellate limitation period
provided for by the county zoning ordinance and a Minnesota statute. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation and application of procedural
limitation periods set forth in zoning statutes is consistent with the St. Germain,
Bolin, Serna, and Fish Hook decisions. In Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., the
Utah Supreme Court dismissed a suit challenging a county zoning authority's
decision because the complaining party had not commenced his action in district
court within the 90-day limitation period prescribed by the county's zoning
ordinance and the then applicable Utah County Land Use Development and
Management Act. 392 P.2d at 42. As in Lund, the Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to
the adequacy of notice given for the November 12, 1992 Planning Commission
meeting was brought beyond the procedural limitation period set forth in the
UMLUDMA. The Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenge to the Planning Commission's
November 12, 1992 decision came on April 15, 1993 — 154 days after the
November 12, 1992 decision; Plaintiff-Appellees first raised the adequacy of notice
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issue in district court on April 29, 1993 - 168 days after the November 12, 1992
decision. (Record Index at p. 267). On April 15, 1993 and on April 29, 1993, the
public notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting
was "considered adequate and proper" under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9103(2) (1993). Therefore, contrary to Lund and the plain language of the
UMLUDMA, the District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs'
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission's meeting
was time barred because the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed their suit beyond the 30-day
limitation periods set forth in the UMLUDMA.
IV.

The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs1
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by a 90-day
limitation period set forth in the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.
Under the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act ("UOPMA"), any challenge

to a city's actions based on inadequate notice must be brought within a 90-day
limitation period. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993). Section 52-4-8 provides that
[a]ny final action taken in violation of [the public notice
provisions of the UOPMA] is voidable by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be commenced
within 90 days after the action . . . .
Id. (emphasis supplied). The 90-day limitation period provided for in Section 524-8 expired on February 11, 1993. The Evertsen Plaintiffs could not have lawfully
challenged the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision on April 15,
1993 or on April 29, 1993 by virtue of the 90 day limitation period set forth in the
UOPMA. Therefore, for the reasons expressed in Lund, and the other authorities
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set forth in Point III., above, the District Court failed to properly rule that the
Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning
Commission meeting was time barred by the UOPMA.
V.

The District Court could not have concluded that the limitation periods
set forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA
were inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs1 suit.
Under Utah law, procedural due process requires that cities provide

adequate notice before taking any action that will cause an individual to be
deprived of a "significant" property interest. Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department,
616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980). If, for example, a city condemns a landowner's
property without providing adequate notice to the landowner of the
condemnation proceeding, any statutory limitation periods that would otherwise
govern the landowner's ability to challenge the city's condemnation proceedings
will be inapplicable to the landowner's suit. Salt Lake County v. Murray City
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1356 (Utah 1979); W.G. Company v. Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755, 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As Utah courts
have carefully noted, however, this rule of law is applicable only when a city's
actions have caused a "serious" derogation of an individual's property rights, or
have caused an individual to be deprived of a "significant" property interest. Salt
Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d at 1344; Worrall v. Ogden City
Fire Department, 616 P. 2d at 601. In the present case, the District Court did not
receive any evidence upon which it could have based a conclusion that the
Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of any such property rights or interests.
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Therefore, the limitation periods set forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the
UMLUDMA and the UOPMA were fully applicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Worrall, W.G. Company, and Murray City, the
Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence to the District Court that proved
that they had been deprived of any significant property interest or had suffered
any serious derogation of their property rights as a result of the City's actions.
Appropriately, therefore, the District Court made no Finding of Fact that any of
the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been so affected. Thus, the District Court could not
have concluded that the limitation periods governing Plaintiff-Appellees' challenge
to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission meeting had been
rendered inapplicable pursuant to the W.G. Company standard. The Utah
Supreme Court has long recognized that a plaintiff is "out of court" if he fails to
sustain his "burden, by pleading, or proffer of proof on an essential element of
[his] cause of action." Hughes v. McCormick, 412 P.2d 613, 613 (Utah 1966). In the
present case, the issue of whether the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of
any significant property interest as a result of the City's actions was essential to
their ability to invoke the W. G. Company standard, and to pursue an untimely
appeal of the Planning Commission's decision. Accordingly, when the Evertsen
Plaintiffs failed to meet this evidentiary burden, the District Court should have
dismissed the Evertsen Plaintiff suit.
Under facts similar to those of the present case and under a rule of law
similar to that employed by the Hughes court, a New York appellate court so
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ruled. In Wood v. Freeman, 251 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), a city
zoning authority held a public zoning meeting and granted permission to a
developer to construct and operate a golf course. Id. Owners of property
adjacent to the golf course subsequently complained that they had not been
notified of the city's actions and, therefore, claimed that the city's failure to
provide actual notice of the zoning meeting constituted an unlawful taking of
their property without due process of law. Id. The Freeman court dismissed the
adjacent property owners' suit because they "failed to show that they [had] been
deprived of property without due process of law ... ." Id. at 998. The Freeman
court explained that "the mere failure of [the adjacent property owners] to receive
a notice of [the zoning] hearing did not deprive them of the enjoyment of their
property; nor ... constitute a taking of [their] property, nor deprive them of its
use and enjoyment." Id. Similarly, the District Court could not have concluded
that the Evertsen Plaintiffs had suffered any "serious" or "substantial" deprivation of
property merely because the City failed to provide them with actual notice of the
November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting. Because the Evertsen
Plaintiffs failed to prove that they had suffered a serious or substantial
deprivation of property as a result of the City's actions, and because the District
Court made no Finding of Fact that the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of
any property interest as a result of the Planning Commission's decision, the
District Court could not have concluded that the limitation periods governing the
Evertsen Plaintiffs' ability to challenge the Planning Commission's decision were
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inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit pursuant to the W.G. Company
standard. Therefore, the District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen
Plaintiffs' appeal of the Planning Commission's decision was time barred by the
statutory limitation periods set forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the UMLUDMA,
and the UOPMA.
In summary, under the Freeman, Hughes, and Worrall principles, the
Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were constitutionally entitled to
receive actual notice of the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting;
the Evertsen Plaintiffs did not prove, nor did the District Court find, that the
Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of any serious or significant property
interest as a result of the City's actions. Therefore, the District Court could not
have concluded that the statutory limitation periods set forth in the Zoning
Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA were inapplicable to the Evertsen
Plaintiffs' suit. Consequently, the District Court should have ruled that the notice
given by the City for the Planning Commission meeting was "adequate and proper"
as determined by section 10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA, and that the Evertsen
Plaintiffs' district court suit was time barred by the statutory limitation periods set
forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA. The District
Court committed plain error by failing to so conclude.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
American Capital is entitled to relief from the District Court's order
because the District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs'
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challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission meeting
was time barred by statutory limitation periods contained in the Zoning
Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA. The District Court could not have
concluded that these limitation periods were inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs'
suit because the Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to prove that they were deprived of a
serious or significant property interest because the City failed to provide adequate
notice of the November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting. Therefore, the
District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit was time
barred because all statutory limitation periods specified in the Zoning Ordinance,
the UMLUDMA and the UOPMA had expired.
For the foregoing reasons, American Capital respectfully submits that
this Court should grant this Appeal and direct the District Court to enter an order
declaring that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal was not lawfully before the City
Council, and to order the City to reinstate the conditional use permit issued to
American Capital by the Planning Commission on November 12, 1992.
DATED this 4th day of May, 1994.

DAVID J. JORDAN
NILEW. ]PATMON
STOEL RIVES BOLEY JONES & GREY
Attorneys for Petitioner American Capital
Development, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 4th day of May, 1994
to the following:

John Bradley
Attorney for Lyle Evertsen and Others
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Steven W. Farr
Attorney for South Ogden City
Bamberger Square Building
205 26th Street Suite 34
Ogden, Utah 84401
Richard L. Stine
Attorney for South Ogden City
2650 Washington Blvd #102
Ogden, Utah 84401
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ATTACHMENT 1

SOUTH OGDEN CITY
ZONING ORDINANCE

ADOPTED 8 JANUARY 1980
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ARTICLE 7

CONDITIONAL USES

25-7-1.
25-7-2.
25-7-3.
25-7-4.
25-7-5.
25-7-6.
25-7-7.
25-7-8.

Purpose and Intent
Conditional Use Permit
Review Procedure
Determination
Basis for Issuance of Conditional Use Permit
Appeal
Building Permit
Expiration

25-7-1.

Purpose and Intent The purpose and intent of conditional uses is to allow in
certain areas compatible integration of uses which are related to the permitted
uses of the zone, but which may be suitable and desirable only in certain locations
in that zone due to conditions and circumstances peculiar to that location and/or
upon certain conditions which make the uses suitable and/or only if such uses are
designed, laid out, and constructed on the proposed site in a particular manner.

25-7-2.

Conditional Use Permit A Conditional Use Permit shall be required for all uses
listed as Conditional Uses in the zone regulations. A Conditional Use Permit may
be revoked by the City Council after review and recommendation by the Planning
Commission, upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed with the original
approval of the permit

35-7-3.

Review Procedure.

1.

Apphcation for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made to the Planning
Commission.

2.

Detailed location, site and building plan shall accompany the complete apphcation
forms provided by the City. For structures in existence, only a location plan need
to be provided.

3.

The apphcation together with all pertinent information shall be considered by the
Planning Commission at its next regularly scheduled meeting.

4.

The Planning Commission may call a specific public hearing on any apphcation
after adequate notice if it is deemed in the public interest The Planning
Commission shall take action on the apphcation by the second meeting of the
Planning Commission after the apphcation filing date. A record of the hearing
together with a decision for the denial or approval of the Conditional Use Permit
with conditions of approval or reasons for denial shall be forwarded to the City
Council.
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25-7-4.

Determination. The Planning Commission may deny or permit a Conditional
Use to be located within any zone in which the particular Conditional Use is
permitted. In authorizing any Conditional Use, the Planning Commission shall
impose such requirements and conditions necessary for the protection of adjacent
properties and the public welfare.

25-7-5.

Basis for Issuance of Conditional Use Permit. The Planning Commission shall
not authorize a conditional use permit unless evidence is presented to establish:

1.

That the proposed use of the particular location is necessary or desirable to
provide a service or facility which will contribute to the general well-being of the
community.

2.

That such use will not, under the operation proposed, be detrimental to the
health, safety and general welfare of the community, nor any part thereof, nor
threaten damage to the property.

3.

That the use will be compatible with and not offensive to surrounding uses from
the standpoint of building design, site layout, traffic both externally and internally,
parking both externally and internally, signs, landscaping, pedestrian traffic,
lighting considerations, material storage and operational characteristics, etc.

4.

That the proposed use will comply with the regulations and conditions specified
in this Ordinance for such use.

5.

That the proposed use conforms to the goals, policies and governing principles
and land use of the Master Plan for South Ogden.

6.

That the proposed use will not lead to the deterioration of the environment or
ecology of the general area, nor will produce conditions or emit pollutants of such
a type or of such a quantity so as to detrimentally affect, to any appreciable
degree, public and private properties including the operation of existing uses
thereon, in the immediate vicinity of the community or area as a whole.

25-7-6.

Appeal to and Review by the City Council.
The decision of the Planning
Commission shall not become final and effective until fifteen days after notice of
that decision has been mailed or delivered to the applicant and delivered to the
City Recorder for presentation to the City Council. It shall not then become final
if, prior to the expiration of that fifteen days, any interested party has appealed
the same to the City Council by filing a written notice of appeal with the City
Recorder or the City Council on its own motion has elected to review that
decision.
The decision of the Planning Commission may be appealed by any interested
party to the City Council by filing such appeal with the City Recorder within
fifteen days after the notice of decision is sent to the applicant. The City Council
may review that decision on its own motion made within that fifteen day period.
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